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Abstract: The majority of medical devices in the healthcare system are not built-in security concepts. Hence, these devices' built-in 
vulnerabilities prone them to various cyber-attacks when connected to a hospital network or cloud. Attackers can penetrate devices, 
tamper, and disrupt services in hospitals and clinics, which results in patients' health and lives threatening. A specialist can Manage 
Cyber-attacks risks by reducing the system's attack surface. Attack surface analysis, either as a potential source for exploiting a potential 
vulnerability by attackers or as a medium to reduce cyber-attacks play a significant role in mitigating risks. Furthermore, it is 
necessitated to perform attack surface analysis in the design phase. This research proposes a framework, which integrates attack surface 
concepts into the design and development of medical devices. Devices are classified as high-risk, medium-risk, and low-risk. After 
risk assessment, the employed classification algorithm detects and analyzes the attack surfaces. Accordingly, the relevant adapted 
security controls will be prompted to hinder the attack. The simulation and evaluation of the framework is the subject of further 
research. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The evolution of technology has created both 
opportunities and challenges in the medical industry. 
Medical devices have changed from a stand-alone mode to 
network-connected systems [1] [2]. The growth of the ever-
growing network of connected devices is fast and extensive 
in various industries comprising the healthcare industry. 
The average hospital room includes 15 to 20 connected 
medical devices nowadays, which can increase to 85,000 in 
large hospitals [3]. Medical Cyber-Physical System (CPS) 
implementations are of great value to reduce medical errors 
and healthcare costs, enhance the safety and quality of care, 
and improve workflow performance while decreasing 
medical professionals' workload [4]. However, it also 
presents vulnerabilities that make medical devices a 
potential attack vector for cyber threats. The cyber threat 
landscape is changing because of the proliferation of 
devices connected to a network. Threats are becoming 
more ubiquitous and complex. A criminal hacker can use 
wireless tools to inject commands that alter the devices' 
functionality or jam the wireless signals to hinder device 
availability and expected therapy delivery [5] [6]. Medical 
devices can be used for cyberwar by targeting politicians 
who use these devices and cause critical health conditions 
or eventual death [7]. Over 100 patients are injured yearly 
because of medical device cybersecurity vulnerabilities [8]. 
Healthcare networks comprise sensitive information 
that is governed by privacy and security regulations. 
Moreover, network-connected medical devices are more 
exposed to security and privacy risks than generic network 
servers or endpoints because of the diversity of devices. 
Medical devices are usually responsible for biomedical or 
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clinical engineering departments whose primary duties are 
calibration and maintenance. As they are not IT 
organizations, security and data protection and remediation 
are difficult. Medical devices have long product life cycles 
and mostly utilize older generations of operating systems. 
Patching and upgrading these systems is not always 
possible, and where it is possible, installation is 
complicated, and acceptance testing is then required. 
Medical device manufacturers should perform security 
updates for device control and configuration validation 
instead of device owners [9]. Lack of access by 
manufacturers limits security and data protection upgrades 
and timely solutions. Manufacturers often use customized 
versions of standard operating systems, as memory space 
in embedded systems is restricted.  
Consequently, the application of software patches and 
security solutions is complex. Most healthcare providers 
prefer to use one specific model and manufacturer to reduce 
the training overhead. Hence, a homogeneous environment 
will be created in which security breaches disseminate 
rapidly among systems. 
Medical device vulnerabilities are a risk for patient 
well-being as well as for everything attached to the 
network. These devices have mostly open TCP/UDP ports 
and enable protocols such as TFTP, FTP, and Telnet, which 
are vulnerable to attacks by default [10]. Approaches such 
as ICMP and NMAP can be utilized to query profile 
devices, although these will cease working once they are 
exposed to multicast network traffic created by worms, 
viruses, and other malware. Moreover, medical devices are 
not often replaced or removed from service. There are four 
types of cyberattacks on medical devices: remote, physical 
by authorized users, physical by unauthorized users, and 
physical by criminals [11]. Medical devices are vulnerable 
to wireless-based attacks that encompass jamming, 
eavesdropping, replay, and injection attacks [12]. Due to 
the vast amount of software applications in medical 
devices, the likelihood of software vulnerabilities also has 
increased [13] [6]. For instance, in Hanna et al., research 
[6], four vulnerabilities were found in Automated External 
Defibrillator (AED) as arbitrary code execution because of 
a buffer overflow vulnerability, weak authentication 
mechanism, inappropriate credentials’ storage, and 
unauthorized firmware update as improper use of the 
Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC). 
Threats to medical devices can be accidental or 
intentional and arise from insiders, outsiders and natural 
events [14]. According to Arney et al. [15], threats are 
classified as passive and active. Passive threats comprise 
information gathering, interception, and sniffing network 
data. Active threats encompass disruption of device 
communications, social engineering, data breach, spoofing 
or impersonation, phishing, denial of service, malicious 
code, intellectual property theft, physical destruction, 
escalation of privileges, and patient information loss. 
Some of the extreme threats to medical devices are 
ransomware, malware, and cryptojacking [16]. 
Ransomware is one of the most common threats which 
compromise data and block users or clinical access to their 
system, demanding the high price of a patient’s sensitive 
data (a ransom) to restore access. The data may be removed 
automatically if the commanded ransom is not paid in time. 
Around 78% of healthcare providers have been targeted by 
either malware or ransomware, or both in the past 12 
months. Via crypto-jacking, a compromised device 
processing power will be controlled to mine 
cryptocurrency leading to lifetime reduction and threaten 
patient safety. Medical device vulnerabilities need to be 
remediated to prevent or mitigate potential cyber threats to 
medical devices. Hence, a proactive approach is required 
during all stages of the device’s lifecycle. This paper 
presents such an Attack-Surface-Reduction-by-Design 
approach. The contributions in this research work are as 
follows. 
a. A new security framework for networked medical 
devices.  
b. Classification of attack surfaces and applying the 
relevant security controls to mitigate the attack's effect or 
hinder the attack completely.  
c. Declaration of how the proposed solution can 
address medical devices' risks in the early stage of 
development and before vulnerabilities exploitation. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section two illustrates the challenges of CPS in healthcare. 
The related works on protection strategies in medical 
devices are discussed in Section three. Section four 
presents an overview of the Attack-Surface- Reduction by 
the design approach for medical devices. Finally, the 
conclusions are described in Section five with the 
discussion of future research. 
 
2. CHALLENGES OF CPS IN HEALTHCARE 
The emergence of sophisticated CPS shifts medical 
devices' tendency towards active devices consisting of 
computational embedded systems with sensors and 
actuators while sustaining passive devices [17]. Medical 
devices are either Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) or 
wearable devices capable of communicating via wireless 
capabilities. CPS applications have various communication 
technologies consist of different protocols, wired and 
wireless technologies. Medical devices mostly used 
wireless communication. IMDs use low frequency (LF) 
signals known as Medical Implant Communication Service 
(MICS), while wearable devices utilize Body Area 
Network (BAN) such as Bluetooth and ZigBee [18]. Most 
of the security threats to wireless communication consist of 
impersonation, eavesdropping, and jamming, which can be 
exploited to compromise the healthcare CPS [19]. 
 
 





Healthcare-related CPS such as IMDs, BAN, and wearable 
devices with limited computational capability, 
communication intricacy, and challenged battery life, 
privacy, and security play a significant critical role [5] [18]. 
The level of security in each system is different according 
to the information sensitivity and control system. Design, 
development and implementation of a robust CPS in 
application domains such as healthcare pose various 
hurdles and restrictions because of inadequate standard 
interfaces and communication protocols [20]. Challenges 
of CPS in healthcare encompass software reliability, 
medical devices interoperability, data extraction, prototype 
architecture, complex query processing, security and 
privacy, and system feedback [21] [22] [23]. Figure 1 
specifies the challenges pertinent to CPS in healthcare. 
3. RELATED WORKS ON MEDICAL 
DEVICES PROTECTION STRATEGIES 
Halperin et al. [24] presented a mechanism that hinders 
unauthorized access to patients’ IMDs, using 
cryptographic-based authentication and key-exchange. 
This mechanism depends on external radio frequency 
instead of consuming batteries. Out-of-Band (OBB) 
authentication with additional channels was employed in 
wearable and implantable devices [5]. Biometrics also was 
used to encrypt communication in the body sensor network 
(BSN). Gollakota et al. [23] presented an external wearable 
device (the shield) to exploit jam signals and commands by 
an unauthorized party to an IMD. Their design jam the 
IMD’s messages and thwart others from decoding them. 
The Shield can decode them by itself. Furthermore, it 
allows jamming unauthorized commands, including those 
that try to modify the shield’s own transmissions. Its 
implementation was in radio software and was evaluated 
with commercial IMDs. Remote capabilities used for 
interaction between remote physicians and patients’ 
devices enable attackers to penetrate networks. Hence, 
manufacturers should disable remote capabilities from 
sending commands and limit them to receive measures and 
logs that reduce the usability of such devices [25]. Mitchell 
and Chen [26] proposed a behavior-rule specification-
based technique for IDS to determine sensors and actuators 
that compromise patients’ safety. Their proposal was for 
stand-alone medical devices. IMDGuard was introduced by 
Xu et al. [27] to defend against jamming and spoofing 
attacks. Hayajneh et al. [28] proposed an approach based 
on the Rabin authentication algorithm to enhance its 
signature signing process to hinder the unauthenticated and 
remote commands on the patients’ IMDs. Guo et al. [29] 
adopted the distributed nature of the e-Health system, 
permitting patients and physicians to perform 
authentication. The proposed attribute-based 
authentication scheme framework called PAAS is designed 
to preserve higher privacy levels on attributes and attribute 
values even though it has more computation cost and 
communication resources. 
 
Figure 1: Challenges of CPS in healthcare 
 
Secure authentication and key agreement scheme for a 
cloud-assisted wireless body area networks (WBAN) 
system using extended chaotic maps were proposed by Li 
et al. [30]. This scheme encrypts the collected health items 
before diffusion. This scheme is practical for the patient’s 
authentication in medical care systems. Lounis et al. [31] 
implemented an access control based on cipher text-policy 
attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) for wireless sensor 
networks. This technique decreased the management 
overhead and the encryption/decryption time. This model 
delineates scalability, efficiency, and it is fine-grained. Gao 
and Thamilarasu [32] developed feature sets to employ 
IMD devices being tested through three different 
algorithms such as decision tree, Support Vector Machine 
(SVM), and K-means algorithms. Liu and Li [33] presented 
a clustering method using k-anonymity. The most similar 
records will be assigned to the same clusters, which 
strengthens identity privacy preservation. The similarity 
between the two records is measured in regard to the 
Euclidean distance in which the parameters are determined 
based on the actual requirement. 
 
Table 1 delineates the strength and drawbacks of 
various relevant works. Although these schemes and 
techniques employed different security controls to enhance 
feasibility and preserve medical devices’ privacy and 
security, they have some drawbacks that emphasize the 
necessity for further investigation and improvement. For 
instance, Gao and Thamilarasu [32] assessed the machine 
learning models’ effectiveness in detecting attacks. 
Although their model showed the highest detection 
accuracy and low false-positive rate compared to all other 
algorithms, it failed to detect the insider attacker who has 
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it requires further investigation for this type of attack 
surface to mitigate or preclude the cyberattacks. 
Furthermore, the reported attacks against security controls 
employed in healthcare CPS applications delineate these 
mechanisms’ insufficiency in securing information and 
communication [34]. Medical Devices are vulnerable to 
attacks; hence, the need for designing and developing an 
appropriate security mechanism arises. The goal is to 
define a suitable mechanism, which provides both security 
and privacy. Security assures that only the authorized 
entities can access, identify and configure devices, and 
privacy assures the protection of devices’ private 
information. 
A well-protected medical device requires accurate 
security mechanisms that consider threat landscape 
alterations. All possible attack surfaces within the medical 
device environment must be considered in the design 
phase. The main requisite in the product development 
lifecycle for medical devices is security-by-design. Vora 
and Schaeffer [11] reported that, some security 
mechanisms such as access control, network scanning, 
attack surface reduction, the root of trust, the digital 
signature, encryption methods, and software updates, 
among others can be used to either thwart attacks or 
attenuate the impact on medical devices. The 
implementation of all these mechanisms in a single 
platform is not feasible. According to risk management, a 
set of several mechanisms can be integrated to provide 
strong protection against cyber threats. The advantage of 
the proposed framework is that it can detect the insider 
attacker who has more information about the medical 
device and mitigate the relevant attack surfaces, but Gao 
and Thamilarasu’s [32] method failed to detect insider 
attackers. 
Table 1: Comparison of related works 
Author Method Strength Drawbacks 




sensible key exchange) 
defenses according to RF 
power harvesting in 
which two of these 
defenses are human-
centric. 
Mitigates the privacy 
violation and patient data 
and therapy settings 
malicious modifications 
without instantaneously 
drawing power from a 
battery. 
Failure modes without 




Gollakota et al. [23] Proposed a physical layer 
solution called the shield 
employing a novel radio 
design that can act as a 
jammer-cum-receiver.  
 
It provides confidentiality 
for IMDs’ transmitted 
data and shields IMDs 
from unauthorized 
commands efficiently 
with no changes to the 
IMDs themselves. 
Lack of usability of 
wearable devices. 
Xu et al. [27] Researchers introduced 
IMD Guard using two 
tailored techniques.  
 No transmit and receive at 
the same time. 
Lack of confidentiality. 
 
Guo et al. [29] Researchers proposed a 
framework called PAAS 
in e-Health networks that 
control users’ verifiable 
attributes to authenticate 
users’ eHealth systems. It 
includes only two end 
users instead of 
centralized infrastructures 
for authentication.  
It is efficient in 
preserving the privacy 




It does not preserve user 











Mitchell and Chen [26] Researchers presented a 
methodology to transform 
behavior rules to a static 
machine in which a 
device that is being 
monitored for its behavior 
can easily be monitored if 
it delineates abnormal 
behavior. 
 
This technique has 
feasible trade false 
positives for a high 
detection probability of 
coping with more 
sophisticated and hidden 
attackers to support ultra-
safe and secure MCPS 
applications. 
Furthermore, it 
outperforms two existing 
anomaly-based 
techniques used for 
abnormal patient behavior 
detection in pervasive 
healthcare applications. 
 
Only support stand-alone 
medical devices. 
No adversary modeling 
and intrusion defense 
modeling research based 
on the accumulation of 
deviation from good 
states to increase detect 
rate.  
Hayajneh et al. [28] Researchers proposed a 
lightweight public-key-
based authentication 
protocol for wireless 
Medical Sensor Networks 
(MSNs) with an enhanced 
signature signing process 




Can deliver secure, 
prompt, and authenticated 
commands from the 
medical staff to the MSN 
nodes. Furthermore, it 
decreases the delays up to 
80 % that is a severe issue 
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Li et al. [30] Researchers presented a 
secure cloud-assisted 
architecture to access and 
monitor health items 
collected by WBAN 
using the Diffie-Hellman 




Ensures patient privacy 
and system 
confidentiality as well as 
preserving the minimum 
computation for either 
medical treatment or 
remote medical 
monitoring. 
It achieves desirable 
security functionalities 
consist of mutual 
authentication, session 
key agreement, perfect 
forward secrecy, and non-
repudiation in doctor 
diagnosis.  
Furthermore, its 
implementation is useful 
for mobile emergency 
medical care systems. 
 
Not preserving backward 
secrecy. 
No mutual and strong 
anonymity. 
Lounis et al. [31] Researchers proposed a 
new architecture to 
collect and access vast 
generated data by medical 
sensor networks.  
Moreover, presented an 
operative and flexible 
security mechanism using 
Ciphertext Policy 
Attribute-based 
Encryption (CP-ABE).  
It provides an effective, 
fine-grained and scalable 
access control in normal 
and emergency situations. 
It does not attain practical 
computation outsourcing 
as an entire trusted entity 
does data encryption.   





learning models in attack 
detection, developed 
feature sets to precisely 
profile a medical device, 
and checked any 
deviations. 
It achieves the maximum 
detection accuracy, low 
false positive-rate, as well 
as prompt training and 
prediction pace.  
It failed to detect the 
insider attacker who has 
more information about 
the medical device. 
Liu and Li [33] Researchers presented a 
definite threat model for 
wearable devices' data 
sharing process, using a 
K-anonymity method.   
It provides sufficient 
anonymity and identity 
disclosure protection.  
It preserves IoT devices’ 















4. ATTACK-SURFACE-REDUCTION BY 
DESIGN APPROACH 
A. Attack Vectors 
The possible attack vectors that lead to security breaches 




Figure 2: Attack vectors.
 
 
B. A Proposed Secure Framework 
Medical devices need to be classified at an early stage 
to identify their significant level of risk. For instance, if 
the device malfunction will affect the patient life, it 
delineates that this device security and privacy 
preservation should be done at the highest level to prevent 
any source of disruption or mitigate the possibility of 
attacking this device to the least level. In this paper, a 
secure framework is proposed to detect cyber-attacks 
against networked medical devices. The proposed 
framework can reduce attack-surfaces by design. There are 
three types of devices in this framework: high-risk, 
medium-risk, and low-risk [35]. 
(Source: Yaqoob et al., [35]) 
a. High-risk devices. These devices pose the highest 
security risks and vulnerabilities and entail the 
most rigid and precise controls.      
b. Medium-risk devices. These devices, which are 
less prone to security risks than high-risk devices, 
are vulnerable to effectiveness and safety.                                   
c. Low-risk devices. These devices are simple and 
are released from regulatory controls. 
This classification is based on the FDA categorization of 
medical devices concerning the risks associated with them. 
Medical devices need to be classified at an early stage to 
identify their significant level of risk. For instance, if the 
•Lack of secure practices to develop software
• Insufficient checks to update firmware 
•Apply of malicious embedded hardware, etc.
Software/Firmware/Hardware 
vulnerabilities
• Impractical existing security solutions
•Use of outdated proprietary protocol 
• Inappropriate configuration of protocol
Communication protocols
•Over-privileged nature
• Incompatible with regulations
Personal devices
•Lack of security controls
App connection to gateway by 
Wi-Fi
•Lack of robust encryption, authentication, and access 
control
• Improper policy framework
Storage of data at gateway
• Inappropriate security mechanismsGateway connection to the cloud
•Insufficient robust encryption, authentication, and 
access control 
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device malfunction will affect the patient life, it delineates 
that this device security and privacy preservation should 
be done at the highest level to prevent any source of 
disruption or mitigate the possibility of attacking this 
device to the least level. 
Hence, devices will go through risk assessment to be 
specified whether the risk impact is critical, major, or 
minor. The risks are posed to humans by devices and 
require various security controls to ensure safety and 
efficiency. After the risk assessment, the attack surfaces 
are checked.  
Attack surface is a list of system inputs that an attacker can 
use to compromise a system. If the attack surface is 
reduced as much as possible, the system can be more 
resilient to be compromised. According to the attack 
surface analysis, attacks can be from humans, networks, 
systems, and any combination [36]. 
a) Human attack surface: This surface is the potential 
for insider threats, fraud, and social attacks such as 
phishing and social engineering. It encompasses any 
accidental activity or any deliberate malicious activity 
performed by an authenticated insider and can bypass 
the system and compromise its safety. 
b) Network attack surface: The communication 
protocols can be used as a source of attacks consisting 
of, among others, the DoS, man-in-the-middle, and 
spoofing.  
c) System attack surface: This surface constitutes 
physical attacks comprised of reverse engineering, 
hardware attacks, side-channel attacks, malicious 
USB key, etc. Also, software attacks can occur by 
malicious code comprising worms, and run time 
attacks. 
d)   Aggregate attack surface: Any integration of 
humans, networks, systems surface can be used as a 
source of attacks. 
Attack surfaces are unavoidably visible across various 
abstraction layers and can lead to privacy breaches and 
information leakage as well as bypassing security controls. 
Hence, their detection is significant for alleviating 
vulnerabilities and remediating the risks via prevention 
and mitigation strategies and measures to reduce the attack 
surface associated with networked medical devices. 
In this framework, the decision tree learning algorithm 
(optimized implementation of the C4.5) is applied to 
classify the attack surfaces. Decision trees are a very 
popular tool for predictive analytics as they are relatively 
easy to use, provide highly interpretable output and 
explicit visualization in a tree diagram  [37]. Furthermore, 
classification is fast once rules are developed with not 
much computation. Classification is based on the features 
that provide the most information to be used to assign the 
attack surfaces to the accurate class. 
After detecting the attack sources, the relevant security 
controls will be called and used to mitigate the attack’s 
effect or hinder the attack completely. Security controls 
are set based on the attack surfaces classification. For 
instance, if attacks are detected from the network, security 
controls that are explicitly relevant to network protection 
such as HIDS/HIPS, network scanning, the digital 
signature, and encryption will help manage the protection 
and block attack tools techniques. If attacks are from the 
system, system authentication or authorization methods 
are employed to decrease process and data resources 
disclosure [37]. Also, attacks can be detected from the 
system. In this case, the root of trust and security 
monitoring techniques are applied to provide protection. 
Attacks can be detected from a combination of any of the 
mentioned surfaces, called an Aggregate attack surface. 
For Aggregate attack surfaces, various security controls 
from different surfaces are recalled mitigating an attack. 
Ensuring security is an intricate task as attackers 
endeavor to manipulate the system context to gain access. 
Employing the proposed framework can provide a 
comprehensive understanding of medical devices’ 
elements, the parts that can be breached for an attack, 
when and how the attack surface changes, and what this 
means from a risk perspective. Hence, risks to medical 
devices can be addressed in the early stages of 
development and before vulnerability exploitation. This 
will result in the patients’ security enhancement. Figure 3 














5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The adoption and integration of wired and wireless 
networked medical devices in the healthcare industry have 
created the risk of cyber-attacks. Medical devices are 
insecure by design and can be exposed to risks due to the 
increase in cyber threats' number and complexity. These 
threats can be used as an access point for entry to a hospital 
or health care networks if their vulnerabilities are not 
addressed and remediated. Cyber threats represent a large 
attack surface, which could interfere with health care and 
even endanger patients’ lives. The likelihood of exposure 
to attack surfaces and vulnerabilities to malicious attackers 
grows with the increasing numbers of connected medical 
devices. Incorporating security strategies to decrease 
attack surfaces at the design phase is an example of best 
practice to counteract cyberattacks. An attack-surface-
reduction framework that integrates the attack surface 
concepts into medical devices' design is proposed in this 
research. In this research, the conceptual framework, 
which incorporates attack surface concepts into the design 
and development of medical devices, is presented. The 
simulation and the evaluation of the proposed framework 
are the subjects of future research. This framework is 
practical in assessing cyber risks and providing a feasible 
approach to mitigate cyber-attacks. Using this framework 
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The proposed framework can advance the medical 
device interoperability safely and securely in addition to 
addressing security and privacy challenges of CPS in 
healthcare that are required for ensuring patients’ data 
privacy. This framework acts as a protected management 
system in which medical devices can communicate in a 
protected and secure interface. The prototype architecture 
for medical devices has insufficient security and reliability 
that compromise testing, evaluation, and development.   
One of the proposed framework outputs introduces the 
relevant categorization of risks as critical, major, and 
minor that are evaluated based on the risk impact. Via the 
proposed framework, classifying medical devices into 
high-risk, medium-risk, and low-risk and applying the 
relevant security controls based on their class can provide 
adequate security and reliability.  
Furthermore, a secure medical devices network will 
ultimately facilitate greater patient confidence, lead to 
better care coordination, enhance information exchange, 
and improve patient care. Lastly, the simulation and 
evaluation of the framework is the subject of further 
research in the future. The security threats to connected 
medical devices are occurred because of forging, 
tampering, data injection, and spoofing attacks. A 
simulated sample of these attacks will be tested to evaluate 
the framework’s feasibility and effectiveness in detecting 
attacks. The assumption in the attack scenario is that an 
attacker manipulates medical devices, targeting to read or 
modify patient data. Medical devices should be classified 
into the relevant category (High-risk, Medium-risk, and 
Low-risk) accurately via the proposed framework. The 
feasibility of the framework in detecting attack surfaces 
will be tested, and the effectiveness of the employed 
security controls in mitigating or blocking the attacks will 
be evaluated. The result of the decision tree learning will 
be compared with other learning algorithms, such as the 
support vector machine, to test the classifier's 
performance.   
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